Developing understanding of pupil feedback using Habermas’ notion of communicative action by Dann, R
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=caie20
Download by: [UCL Library Services] Date: 17 January 2017, At: 07:26
Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy & Practice
ISSN: 0969-594X (Print) 1465-329X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caie20
Developing understanding of pupil feedback using
Habermas’ notion of communicative action
Ruth Dann
To cite this article: Ruth Dann (2016) Developing understanding of pupil feedback using
Habermas’ notion of communicative action, Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy &
Practice, 23:3, 396-414, DOI: 10.1080/0969594X.2015.1056083
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0969594X.2015.1056083
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 01 Sep 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 493
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 1 View citing articles 
Developing understanding of pupil feedback using Habermas’
notion of communicative action
Ruth Dann*
Faculty of Education, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK
(Received 28 September 2014; accepted 25 May 2015)
The focus of this article is to explore the notion of pupil feedback and the
possible ways in which it can be understood and developed using Jürgen
Habermas’ theory of Communicative Action. The theoretical position adopted is
framed within the concept of assessment for learning, and is particularly related
to the notion of assessment as learning within AfL. Furthermore, the paper is
located within a social constructivist perspective. Jürgen Habermas’ theory of
Communicative Action enables us to recognise that feedback, and more impor-
tantly the interpretation of feedback, cannot be a one-way process. Without
recognition of pupil interpretation, its very purpose (to alter the learning gap) is
compromised. This paper offers new ways of exploring feedback, which recog-
nise complexity and the importance of interpretation and relationships in shared
negotiated communicative contexts. It further contributes to the ways in which
assessment and learning are understood and intersect.
Keywords: feedback; communicative-action; assessment-as-learning; learning
gap
Context and introduction
The importance of feedback to pupils as part of the interconnection of teaching,
learning and assessment is well identiﬁed and documented in the research literature.
Hattie and Timperley (2007) and Shute (2008) perhaps offer the most detailed
accounts offering a synthesis and critique of feedback processes and types. The
notion of feedback explored in this paper falls clearly within the conceptualisation of
Assessment for Learning (Black & Wiliam, 1998; Sadler, 1998) as well as being
related to Assessment as Learning (AaL) (Dann, 2002, 2014), highlighting the ways
in which feedback enables learning to advance as part of the learning process.
The notion of AaL advanced here relates to possible ways in which processes of
engaging in assessment and thinking about assessment may also become dimensions
of learning. Dann states that AaL is ‘the complex interplay of assessment, teaching
and learning which holds at its core the notion that pupils must understand their own
learning progress and goals through a range of processes which are in themselves
cognitive events’ (2014, p. 151). This contrasts with the use of AaL in the ‘deforma-
tive’ sense, in which assessment takes over and dominates the curriculum so that
what is assessed is mainly what is learnt (Torrance, 2007, 2012).
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Black and Wiliam (2009, p. 10) highlight the importance of AFl as being
concerned with the creation of and capitalization upon ‘moments of contingency’.
The focus here is with inﬂuencing and shaping the future. Indeed, Hattie and
Timperley (2007) promote three key feedback questions: ‘Where am I going? How
am I going? Where next?’ But the evidence also shows that feedback can often yield
no improvement in learning or, in the worst case, decrease learning (Black &
Wiliam, 1998). Establishing the parameters of effective feedback has featured in the
literature over several decades and is worthy of brief attention as a prelude to explor-
ing the possible application of Habermas’ (1984, 1987) notion of Communicative
Action. After considering what we know about feedback and its limitations, some
examination will be given to Habermas’ notion of Communicative Action so that its
possible role in facilitating new thinking will be explored. Although CA will be con-
sidered more fully subsequently in the paper, in its crudest sense, it is a speech act
between at least two individuals, in which interpretation is genuinely sought from
each participant so that agreement can be reached through negotiated agreement.
(Habermas, 1984). In considering what CA means and how it might be applied, dis-
cussion includes some brief consideration of the political UK education context with
particular reference to the school as an example of a colonised space with a domi-
nant performance agenda (Habermas, 1987). Discussion related to how ideas for
feedback practices may be distilled from Habermas’ notion of CA form an alterna-
tive discourse. The ﬁnal section of the paper suggests some of the opportunities that
adopting some of Habermas’ thinking may have for development of the practices of
feedback.
What do we know about the process of feedback within the teaching and
learning encounter?
Sadler has offered considerable groundwork for our understanding of feedback. His
original contribution (1989) suggests that feedback is a mechanism for helping to
close the learning gap. Its purpose is to reduce the gap between what is known and
what needs to be known. Its success, therefore, is dependent on it being able to
‘alter the gap’ (p. 121) and so helping learning to progress. Sadler promotes three
typical teacher acts, which, he claims, deﬁne feedback (1998). Firstly, that ‘the tea-
cher must attend to the learners’ production’ (p. 80). Secondly, that the teacher
makes some kind of evaluation against a background or framework reference which
involves identifying pupils’ strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the teacher makes an
explicit response, mark, grade or verbal/written statement about the quality and the
shortcomings that can be remedied. Sadler suggests that these acts require that teach-
ers bring a particular set of experiential and intellectual resources, including: supe-
rior knowledge; a disposition that drives their intentions to help learners; knowledge
of how to gain pupils’ responses that show their learning, understanding of expected
standards, skills in making evaluative judgements and framing feedback statements.
Although Sadler recognises that perhaps these processes may seem ‘unidirectional’,
he welcomes pupil involvement. He promotes the view that ‘a strong case can be
made that students should be taught how to change their pattern of thinking so that
they know not only how to respond to and solve (externally sourced) problems but
also how to frame problems themselves’ (p. 81). Furthermore, he argues for
consideration of the language, which teachers use for feedback ensuring that termi-
nology is already known and understood by the learners (p. 82). He suggests that
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perhaps learners should be inducted into the feedback processes used by the teachers
so that they can more fully participate. Accordingly, the importance of pupil self and
peer assessment features as a possibility.
What Sadler stops short of recognising are that pupils may need to engage with
feedback quite differently. Indeed, Sadler makes claims to the contrary offering his
view that ‘any tendency on the part of the teacher to provide differential levels of
feedback for learners of different levels of performance (especially at the lower end)
treats students inequitably’ (p. 82). His view of feedback offers a picture which
begins to explore purpose and processes. His view seems to only acknowledge
pupils as recipients or as participants who need greater skills in understanding pre-
stated processes of expertise that teachers might like to more deliberately share with
learners. Even though pupil self and peer assessment is brought into consideration,
it is done so in a fairly predetermined way.
When feedback is focused on altering a learning gap, the way in which this is
gap is both constructed and managed seems critical. More critical than perhaps
Sadler acknowledges. It may well be that pupils try to alter their own learning gaps
in unintended ways, possibly by even disengaging with the goals set (Steinberg,
1996). This may call for the need to explore, rather than close the learning gap
(Dann, 2014; Torrance, 2012).
It is perhaps Torrance and Pryor (1998) and Pryor and Crossouard (2008), who
give the clearest insight into possible categorisations, in which feedback, as part of
formative assessment, may be regarded. Torrance and Pryor (1998) identify feedback
as convergent or divergent. Convergent assessment being reﬂected by
the teacher giving closed or pseudo-open questions and tasks where there was a clear
idea (at least for the teacher) of what constituted a correct response. They then gave
authoritative, judgmental or quantitative feedback on what the learners said or did
where errors were contrasted with correct responses. This feedback focused on the
successful completion of the task in hand. (Pryor & Crossouard, 2008, p. 4).
It can be seen in similar terms to Black and Wiliam’s (1998) notion of feedback
directed to pupils’ objective needs (p. 17); directive feedback and in keeping with
Hattie and Timperley’s (2007) ‘ask-focused’ feedback (p. 91).
Divergent assessment, on the other hand, is seen as more open, looking for what
pupils understand or can do. Feedback, within divergent assessment, is identiﬁed as
‘exploratory, provisional and provocative’ (p. 4). Such distinctions can also be
linked to typologies of feedback which are well illustrated by Tunstall and Gipps
(1996),who identiﬁed feedback as being evaluative or descriptive in either positive
or negative ways. Adding to attempts at clariﬁcation and deﬁnition, Hattie &
Timperley seek to identify four levels of feedback: feedback on the task (FT); on the
process to complete the task (FP); feedback on the process of self-regulation (FR);
feedback on the self as a person (FS). They claim that FS, which is usually in the
form of praise, is least effective.
Signiﬁcant attention has been given in recent years to explore aspects of class-
room practice in terms of, ‘what works’. Trying to understand feedback and its role
in promoting learning, seems closely linked to such attempts. Clearly, what works
may be constructed in a variety of ways. Meta-analysis has been a signiﬁcant factor
in recent years in establishing how practices might be taken forward. Hattie’s work
(2009 and 2012) has helped frame how research evidence might be interpreted and
used as an evidence base for practice in schools. Some of the meta-analysis put
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forward by Hattie features in the Educational Endowment Fund/Sutton Trust toolkit
(2014). Here, the ‘effect size’ of feedback is ranked as the highest (along with self-
regulation and metacognition) for advancing learning by about eight months. It is
considered to have low cost, high impact and be based on medium levels of evi-
dence. It is clearly promoted as a classroom practice worth pursuing. However,
when looking more closely at Hattie’s commentary and to some extent the notes in
the toolkit, understanding feedback and putting it into practice is far more complex.
Even when the focus is exclusively on analysis of quantitative research data (Hattie,
2009 preface ix) and success is measured mainly in terms of gains in academic
achievement, feedback as a simple act which can easily be framed in order to pro-
mote learning lies far beyond the scope of most studies. Studies which are more
classroom-bound and qualitative illustrate how what happens in classrooms is often
based on quite formal and prescribed notions of feedback. Murtagh (2014) examines
the practices of two primary school teachers, who despite being clear of their own
intentions of using feedback to enhance learning, seem to fall short of what they
aim to achieve. Similarly, Hargreaves (2013) gleans information from the children
about how they experience teacher feedback in order to try and ascertain its impact
on their learning. What emerges in classrooms is that feedback is understood to be
powerful and has the potential to impact signiﬁcantly on learning. However, the role
of the teacher in giving feedback is all too often naively constructed as a one-way
process, which will lead to closing a learning gap which is predetermined by the
teacher in a tightly focused externally measured objectives-driven context (Nicol &
Macfarane-Dick, 2006). The many facets of feedback emerging from the literature
seem to identify both possibilities and limitations. Some difﬁculties that limit our
understanding of feedback also need to be highlighted before attention is turned to
what Habermas may have to offer. Consideration is now given to recognising some
of these current difﬁculties.
Identifying the limits of our understanding of feedback
Children for whom feedback may be less useful are often those, as Bourdieu (1990,
p. 66) identiﬁes as being without a ‘feel for the game’. From Bourdieu’s perspective,
the school is the ‘ﬁeld’ in which the game is played. Participants will use their capi-
tal, strategies, beliefs, priorities to play this game. There is a presumption that all
will invest in the game. It may be, however, that a ‘sense of good investment … dic-
tates a withdrawal from outmoded, or simply devalued, objects, places or practices’
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 249). If Bourdieu’s thinking helps us here, some pupils may
choose to be highly selective in the aspects of schooling in which they chose to
invest. Thus, focused feedback from the teacher may often be seen as irrelevant.
Black, McCormick, James, and Peddar (2006) highlight a similar train of thought as
they claim ‘intentional learners’ gain most from feedback. By implication, there are
those who are not intent on learning or who are less intentional in their approach to
learning. In order to beneﬁt from feedback, there must be some desire for the pupil
to want to move forward with his/her learning. There may be pupils, such as those
Fisher recognises (2011, 2014), who are shy and on the margins of the classroom,
often girls, who hide behind a veil of compliance feeling that they should not indi-
cate if they think differently or are dissatisﬁed. Research also points to particular
learning dispositions. Perkins (1995) suggests that these are the ‘proclivities that
lead us in one direction rather than another, within the freedom of action that we
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have’ (p. 275). Carr and Claxton (2002) suggest that they include curiosity,
opportunism, resilience, playfulness and reciprocity. ‘These are neither unique to a
speciﬁc situation nor generally manifested across all situations’ (p. 12). However,
they argue that such dispositions inﬂuence the ways in which we learn how to learn.
Feedback may therefore provide a useful tool, enabling pupils to develop their own
learning. However, accompanying learning dispositions, their nature and employ-
ment, may be of particular signiﬁcance and require some attention.
It is perhaps Dweck’s (2012) work that offers both a synthesis and reduction of
some of the ideas inherent in learner dispositions. Her suggestions, summarised in
her more popular text, suggest there are two mindsets (growth and ﬁxed) which give
a glimpse of how learners chose to embrace the development of their own learning.
Those with a ﬁxed mindset tend to see themselves as limited to a particular set of
abilities which may serve them well until they experience failure or diminished suc-
cess. Often lack of success, in the individual with a ﬁxed mindset, results in a reluc-
tance to take on board the necessary steps to overcome the failure and move
forwards. They may blame themselves or others but struggle to see how they can
move themselves forward. The growth mindset, on the other hand, refers to the way
in which individuals rise to the challenge of failure or reduced success and draw on
whatever resources they can to change the situation. Clearly, this has strong implica-
tions for the way that individuals use the feedback on offer to them. Part of Dweck’s
analysis also reveals how a mindset can change individuals so that they can begin to
see their own learning differently. This is also echoed in Carr & Claxton’s work
(2002) and Claxton (2008). It thus leaves open ways of using learning and assess-
ment resources more strategically to promote learning and learning dispositions.
Feedback could be considered as a resource, which is partly determined through
assessment, for the purposes of learning. It is, therefore, clearly part of Assessment
for Learning and may be usefully developed to both understand and enhance learner
dispositions. Furthermore, through drawing on a particular process of using feedback
through communicative action, it may also enable learners to develop their learning
skills and thus be considered within the notion of AaL (Dann, 2014).
The main purpose of this paper is to offer an additional conceptual basis for how
we might move forwards with feedback, addressing the possibilities and the limita-
tions of the role and practice of classroom feedback. In addition to the points made
about children’s’ reluctance to engage with feedback and learning, there are also
difﬁculties establishing the best types of feedback. Currently, the research evidence
suggests that feedback is not uniformly successful in terms of the effectiveness of
the types of feedback used. Furthermore, evidence indicates that feedback focused
on speciﬁc description information given to pupils on their work is more effective
than feedback which is linked to personal effort, praise or reward (Hattie &
Timperley, 2007; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Also of importance is that feedback is
contextual, recognising that learning takes place in a learning environment in which
pupils interpret their experiences (Hargreaves, 2013), and draws on their own
self-regulatory devices and learning dispositions (Boekaerts & Corno, 2005; Carr &
Claxton, 2002).
When the research on feedback is synthesised, it reveals a complex picture. This
seems quite different from the practices in classrooms. Within teaching and learning
contexts, which are increasingly objective with prescribed goal orientations,
feedback seems tightly focused and often fairly unproblematic (Murtagh, 2014).
Teachers frequently offer targeted feedback on which pupils should act. Often
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opportunities for pupils to engage with such feedback is apportioned particular time,
timetabled daily or weekly and given labels such as ‘ﬁx it time’. Sometimes scope
is given to pupils to respond to feedback given by the teacher so that a dialogue can
emerge. Nevertheless, this can lead to little more than a ‘forced dialogue’ which is
explicitly linked to teaching and the teachers priorities (Leganger-Krogstad, 2014).
Alexander (2008), in pointing towards possibilities for dialogic assessment, indicates
that dialogic assessment ‘informs the teacher and the pupil precisely how that
learning is progressing and what needs to be done to accelerate and consolidate it’
(p. 33). The use of the word ‘precisely’ seems to suggest that even a dialogic dimen-
sion to feedback is tightly focused and speciﬁcally targeted. Notions of developing
dialogue for formative assessment which may help us move forwards in terms
understanding pupil autonomy and interpretation are still unclear and underre-
searched (Hargreaves, 2013). Lefstein (2010) claims that ‘the institution of schooling
constrains the ways in which dialogue can be conducted within its domain’ (p. 171).
Lefstein identiﬁes a tension between the rules and relationships which may beset
meaningful dialogue to enable learning. This seems particularly pertinent as
feedback is explored. The imperative to focus learning on objective measurables and
to be accountable for aspects of pupil progress may add to the tensions on the
teacher/pupil relationships which feedback seeks to foster. It is in an attempt to
explore feedback more fully so that the process of feedback itself can enhance learn-
ing in a broader sense that the focus of this paper will turn. What currently seems
lacking in conceptualising feedback is a sense in which processes of feedback are
reciprocally linked in order to facilitate learning and illuminate how feedback and
the feedback relationship can be enhanced. It is at this point that Habermas may
offer some useful insights that can help conceptualise feedback in a way that will
further frame our understanding.
Some foundations for understanding Habermas
Habermas’ extensive writings are not focused on assessment, and their consideration
in this paper may be considered an application of his thinking. Although Habermas
offers a philosophical exposition of a meta-theory for how social, political and eco-
nomic systems may be explored and explained, this paper is not seeking to espouse
his meta-level thinking and apply it at a macro level. Indeed, Habermas has been the
subject of considerable critique, not least by those who advocate a more postmodern
perspective. For example, his attempt to be the mediating answer between the
positivist and the postmodern falls ﬂat in the eyes of many philosophers (e.g.
Lyotard, 1994; Ricoeur, 2008). Rather, Habermas’ theory is explored in terms of its
application at a micro level within the school system. It is more speciﬁcally focused
through the practices of Communicative Action, which draw on a more pragmatic
dimension to Habermas’ thinking, which is grounded in the way in which he
perceives the importance of linking the objective, the social and the personal.
Building on the previous discussion of feedback and locating feedback within a
formative context which promotes AaL, this paper seeks to explore ways in which
the notion of CA may offer new insights to further developing feedback practices.
Habermas draws from both pragmatism and hermeneutics, recognising that knowl-
edge is socially constructed and understood and enacted through communication
(speech acts). The process of communication is central for Habermas. Hence, the
potential usefulness of his ideas in relation to feedback, which is essentially a
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communicative mechanism, seems well founded. Additionally, this paper draws on
Habermas’ thinking around deliberative democracy. Here, Habermas’ democratic
ideas are reconsidered and applied to pupils in an institutional context. His original
principles of (‘discursive’) deliberative democracy relate to a form of government in
society which recognises equality and the importance of avenues for moral disagree-
ment and discussion, which ultimately aim towards mutual conclusions yet perpetu-
ally leave opportunities further challenge and discussion (Habermas, 1998).
Application here is brief as this paper is not focusing at a macro level and centres
on relationships between teachers and pupils which may limit how democratic pro-
cesses are practised. However, there are some useful threads to be teased out from
Habermas’ writings.
To set the scene, it is noted that Habermas deﬁnes CA as
the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech acts and action who establish
interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra-verbal means). The actors seek
to reach understanding about the action situation and their plans for action in order to
coordinate actions by way of agreement. The central concept of interpretation refers in
the ﬁrst instance to negotiating deﬁnitions of the situation which admit [of] consensus.
(Habermas, 1984, p. 86)
Habermas makes a clear distinction between strategic action and communicative
action. The former, may generally describe much of what feedback seeks to achieve.
That is, for someone with a particular view (teacher) to inﬂuence the actions of
another (pupil). Signiﬁcantly different to strategic action, Habermas claims, commu-
nicative action requires ‘communicatively achieved agreement [which] has a rational
basis; it cannot be imposed by either party, whether instrumentally through interven-
tion in the situation directly or strategically through inﬂuencing the decisions of
opponents’ (1984, p. 287). Any attempt to gain agreement in a forced or strategic
way, Habermas claims, is unlikely to be successful. Obviously, a clear argument can
be levied here that the teachers’ role is to direct and focus learning. Indeed, in
England, teachers are directly accountable, through performance management, for
their pupil’s progress. What Habermas allows us to consider is that learning is not
fully controlled by teachers, although they hopefully signiﬁcantly inﬂuence it. This
requires us to shift the focus to recognising that pupils have a role in controlling and
regulating their learning. Agreeing actions through communicative processes such as
feedback should be considered to help align intentions and consequences, through
negotiated meanings.
The fundamental concepts underpinning the ways in which Habermas conceptu-
alises his contribution require further attention. This is important for considering the
possibilities and the limitations of his ideas related to pupil feedback. Firstly, his
concern is with rationality and knowledge. Habermas offers a detailed exposition of
the ways in which he understands knowledge, offering his views on how it is con-
structed. His position has been explored and critiqued within philosophy. In-depth
analysis of his philosophical position has been afforded by many philosophers and
formed the subject of considerable debate and contention (see Lyotard, 1994;
McCarthy, 1981; Ricoeur, 2008 for such accounts).
As with any philosophical position, it is framed by certain values beliefs and
insights. Highlighting what these are is the important purpose of this section so that
some justiﬁcation of the relevance of Habermas’ position can be deliberated for
application to understanding notions of feedback. Habermas identiﬁes a close link
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between rationality and knowledge. He claims that rationality is not about
possession of knowledge but about how speaking acting people acquire and use it
(1984, p. 9). It is related to the ways ‘truths’ are expressed and argued for in their
particular contexts. Therefore, whether they are grounded in the objective world or
whether they are propositional and related to a proposed objective world, which
could be criticised and contested, both are relevant. For Habermas, understanding
rationality draws together propositional knowledge (what might be for the individual
subject) together with the objective, which, may be used in different ways for differ-
ent purposes. He distinguishes goal-orientated purposes from phenomenological
ones, in which rational expressions ‘have character of meaningful actions intelligible
in their context, through which the actor relates to something in the objective world’
(1984, p. 13).
Habermas promotes his position on knowledge, which incorporates both the
objective goal-orientated world as well as the subjective phenomenological world.
Moran and Murphy (2012) discuss Habermas’ perspective as being a ‘philosophy of
between’. Of course, embracing such opposites and sitting ‘between’ transitionally
opposing perspectives could be considered impossible for those at either end of this
particular philosophical debate. Yet his attempt to bring these two sides together
offers an attractive one for teachers and researchers who desperately seek to hold, in
some kind of tension, the objective realities of our goal-orientated test-driven
education system with the uniqueness of each child in a learning encounter. For
Habermas, the tension (between the objective and the subjective) is maintained by
reasoned argument. Thus, for Habermas, each participant, in communicative activity,
needs to take a position in which each can offer explanation and reason for their
view. As part of this process, argumentation is also a feature in which the basis for a
perspective is developed through discourse. Here validity claims may be defended
or criticised. Thus argumentation is important as part of the process of learning and,
by extension, formative feedback in the classroom. Through argumentation, mistakes
can be corrected, and failed interventions amended. It allows other positions to be
considered as part of the learning process. For Habermas, the focus of argumentation
will have both normative and moral dimensions. Norms would be themes with par-
ticular domains that have relevance to all, clearly deserving recognition. ‘Valid
norms must be capable in principle of meeting with the rationally motivated
approach of everyone affected under conditions that neutralise all motives except
that of cooperatively seeking the truth’ (1984, p. 19).
Thus, within our school system, the national curriculum could be presented as a
norm as part of the focus of learning. It can, therefore, have a legitimate place in
communicative acts between the teacher and learner (obviously a vital considera-
tion). However, each participant will engage with such norms differently, which
would form the focus of rational discussion. Argumentation is therefore the process
of reﬂective continuation, with different means of action orientated to reaching
understanding. Although argumentation may be normatively regulated, through
existing external agreed knowledge, it should be discussed, redeemed or rejected by
participants (p. 25). If we are to draw from Habermas’ insights here we will need to
consider whether, and if so in what ways, the process of feedback should include
elements of argumentation.
In addition to the way in which norms are rationalised and argued, there is an
additional assumption which is central to Habermas’ thinking. This is the notion of
lifeworld (Lebenswelf). This pervades his thinking, in that all attempts to develop
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knowledge and understanding must take notice of each individual’s own beliefs and
convictions. ‘The structures of the lifeworld lay down the forms of intersubjectivity
of possible understanding’ (1987, p. 126). Habermas therefore recognises that in
each learning encounter, acknowledgement must be given to the objective world; the
shared community (social world); and the individuals own lifeworld (subjective
world). This will include previously successful and unsuccessful encounters with
assessment and feedback, with all the hopes, fears and expectations that these call
forth. Each has validity claims, for its signiﬁcance, that require some consideration
as interpretation of new meanings emerge through arguments and communication.
The relative proportions or weightings of each may alter in different contexts, yet
the importance of all three worlds remains a priority (p. 100).
The underpinning notions which Habermas discusses here offer interesting
insights into how feedback can be further conceptualised. Some of the limitations in
current practices and inconsistencies in effectiveness can be usefully explored by
reference to Habermas’ thinking. The focus for feedback, whether it is positive,
negative, descriptive or evaluative, task-focused or person-focused, may be usefully
explored in terms of rational and argumentative processes, which are used to inter-
pret the next steps for learning. Feedback may be interpreted differently by ‘actors’.
Accordingly, the assumption that it can offer a stable and unambiguous way of inﬂu-
encing learning may be contested. Another way of understanding the potential of
feedback in Habermas’ terms would be as a form of communication in which ‘par-
ticipants rely on problematic and unclariﬁed presuppositions and feel their way from
one occasional commonality to the next’. (Habermas, 1984, p. 101). As each actor
draws on the ‘three worlds’ differently, even if there is agreement in the way that
feedback is interpreted, this still leaves unresolved the way in which action is subse-
quently implemented. Through communicative action, the processes of communica-
tion are seen as a way of co-coordinating future action. Thus, communication acts
as a vehicle for sharing judgements about what has been achieved, for interpretation
of what is needed next and for negotiation of possible actions to move forwards.
These need to be drawn from the perspectives of each actor. There are assumptions
in the classroom context that all actors will choose to engage fully in this process.
Recognition of research by Dweck (2012) and Carr and Claxton (2002) indicate that
those children who may be less inclined to develop their learning may beneﬁt from
more speciﬁc communication which helps change their disposition and understand-
ing of their own agency. This leads to a further area of clariﬁcation in applying
Habermas’ theory. Since the feedback being considered relates to communication
between a teacher and a pupil, further justiﬁcation is needed as to whether children
are able to participate in this power dynamic. Additionally, whether children are
developmentally competent to engage in the processes of communication and
thinking, which Habermas promotes, requires exploration.
Habermas does not give much consideration to how his ideas might be devel-
oped in school contexts. However, his work adequately indicates that institutions,
such as schools, ﬁt into his ideas of communities and domains in society and that he
relates some of his ideas to learning. Habermas seems to take on Dewey’s notion of
schools being a ‘weak public’ (Dewey, 1927). There are two further factors to be
teased out in this paper with important relevance to applying Habermas’ thinking to
the pupils’ role and relationships within feedback. Firstly, children’s developmental
position and secondly, their power status.
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Understanding the pupil/teacher relationship in feedback using Habermasian
perspectives
If Habermas’ thinking on communicative action is to be relevant for considering
how feedback might be better understood and utilised in classrooms, attempts to bet-
ter understand the teacher/pupil relationship are important. A particular dimension of
understanding feedback practices must be the extent to which a recipient is able to
consider next steps in learning which they have hitherto not yet understood or
grasped. If the recipient is a child, does his/her more limited conceptual framework
limit his/her capacity to engage with feedback? Does he draw on what adults would
consider to be irrational and does his/her previous experience frighten him/her? Such
issues have been raised in the literature (Black & Wiliam, 1998; Sadler, 1989, 1998)
and relate to the importance of pupils gaining feedback that they can link to their
own existing capabilities and achievements purposefully. What needs further probing
as we explore what Habermas offers is not only whether the pupil can respond to
the content messages in feedback, but also to the moral and rational skills required.
If we are to take on Habermas’ principles that require pupils to enter into a commu-
nicative exchange, in which each actor presents and justiﬁes his/her own views and
meaningfully negotiates a way forward with agreed action, then a range of addi-
tional skills are needed. Habermas (1990) has already devoted attention to issues of
both cognitive and moral development. He recognised that learners’ moral con-
sciousness has a signiﬁcant role in the learning process. Habermas argues that
beneath cognitive strands of learning and knowledge lies a moral consciousness
which will shape learners’ identity, judgements, interpretations and skills in reciproc-
ity. He draws on Kohlberg’s theory, highlighting that moral judgements have cogni-
tive content, some universalistic principles and are dependent on discourse.
Kohlberg’s theory, which Habermas positions as his starting point, outlines a
developmental model for the formation of reversibility, universality and reciprocity.
Transition through the stages in this model is part of the learning process in which
learners become more skilled at using their moral judgement through argumentation.
They become more skilled at recognising competing perspectives, and deciding how
they will move from discourse to action in their own learning. Habermas, in recog-
nising that Kohlberg’s theory may not fully explain all the he needs, also draws on
Robert Selman’s work on perspective taking (1990). Habermas considers that Sel-
man’s work offers some important insights into understanding the extent to which
children are able to engage with others reciprocally. Habermas concludes that from
as young an age as 5 children, are increasingly able to recognise the differentiated
roles of others and increasingly, from the age of 7, form reciprocal relationships
(from Habermas, 1990, pp. 142–143). Habermas also indicates the capacity for a
child to communicate is fully possible by the ages of 5–9 when the processes of
acquiring language is complete. Accordingly, there are no speciﬁc developmental
barriers to the processes of communicative action being increasingly developed with
children from the age of about 7. Indeed, it could be argued that being more speciﬁc
in trying to engage with such processes may enable and enhance these inherent
skills as well as the speciﬁc learning targeted in feedback (This will be further
developed later in this paper).
Having argued that the dimension of developmental capacity is not a signiﬁcant
limiting factor in further developing Habermas’ ideas, a dimension that may create
more of an issue needs to be tackled. This concerns the power dynamic between the
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teacher and the pupil. A signiﬁcant strand of Habermas’ writing links to the nature
of the relationships between individuals. So, in addition to the way knowledge is
understood, shared and interpreted, and alongside moral consciousness and judge-
ment, are issues related to power and democracy in the process of communicative
action. How does the power dynamic function within feedback, and in what ways
does what is visible (written) actually reﬂect feedback processes? The literature
highlights that often feedback is seen as one way teachers give feedback and pupils
are supposed to receive and act on it. Recognition that the pupils’ role may be more
complex, and that closing the learning gap is not a unidirectional simplistic process
has prompted a search for a different theoretical position. However, pursuing
Habermas’ theory requires a very different power dynamic. It is important that in
exploring a different position, there are legitimate grounds for doing so both
theoretically and practically. This is a considerable area for discussion, but will have
adequate if limited attention in this paper.
An important consideration for Habermas, and one that gives purpose to his
notion of communicative action, is deliberative democracy. Habermas is not alone
in promoting deliberative democracy. Conceptually, it is given considerable atten-
tion in sociology and politics (see Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). Gutmann and
Thompson (2004) summarise deliberative democracy by explaining that it ‘afﬁrms
the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their representations …. In
deliberative democracy an important way these agents (persons) take part is by pre-
senting and responding to reasons, or by demanding that their representatives do so
…. These reasons are meant to produce a justiﬁable decision and to express the
value of mutual respect’ (p. 3). The problematic issue for consideration in the con-
text of this paper, which includes children, is the extent to which children are seen
as part of the democratic process, with particular reference to the inherent power
differences between teachers and pupils. Our social and political systems exclude
children from their formal democratic processes. In line with Selman’s model
(Habermas, 1990), children are still developing their skills in mutual respect from
the ages of 10–15. Without these abilities, democratic encounters may not be fully
possible. Although democratic processes may be exclusive in many ways,
Habermas may be considered to regard democracy as part of the legitimising collec-
tive for groups in society … perhaps at the expense of individual freedoms and
human rights. There is no doubt, that within schools, teachers and pupils are not
equals and thus we must question whether democracy can be used as a driving
force underpinning communicative encounters.
Although Habermas presents deliberative democracy as an important foundation
for communication, it does not necessarily need to be all encompassing. His recogni-
tion that there may be three worlds (objective, social and subjective) which should
feature in communicative interactions, agreements for decisions about actions made
between individuals may differ. Within the school system, there is clearly an
imposed ‘objective world’ which looms large in every teacher’s view of what needs
to be learnt and how pupils must demonstrate their learning, yet there are different
ways in which the social context and learners’ views can be shared and negotiated
in relation to this objective world. Even though schooling as a whole forms part of
the political system which is governed through democracy in the western world,
democratic principles remain more loosely articulated within the school system. Part
of the function of the school is to prepare pupils to become citizens within our
democratic society. What is particularly of interest in this paper is the way in which
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agreements are reached through the feedback process. This may be part of a process
of leading towards democracy, rather than being fully democratic. Kreisberg’s notion
of power with rather than power over (Torrance & Pryor, 1998, p. 82) offers a useful
alternative for articulating the power distinction being suggested. Hence, what is
most valuable to draw from Habermas is his notion of deliberation. The use of the
term deliberative as distinct from participatory democracy highlights the importance
of the procedural. It emphasises the responsibility and consequences as a processes
of being part of a social dimension to citizenship. Consideration in terms of ‘partic-
ipation’ is rather more conﬁned to being merely involved, rather than how the indi-
vidual becomes involved and sustains engagement. Englund (2006) suggests
deliberation is ‘mutual and carefully-balanced consideration of different alternatives’
(p. 506). This is certainly something that should be an aspiration for schooling to
include. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) promote the idea that education systems
need to ensure that pupils are enabled to be deliberative. They claim ‘schools should
aim to develop their student’s capacities to understand different perspectives,
communicate their understandings to other people and engage in the give-and-take
of moral argument with a view to making mutually acceptable decisions’ (p. 359).
Englund (2006) considers Habermas’ notion of deliberative democracy to be less
useful in schools. He recognises (from Dewey, 1927) that schools are ‘weak pub-
lics’, in which the distinctions between the public and the private are more blurred
(Englund, 2006, p. 514). Schools, he contends, have a pluralism in which different
views of knowledge and values need, to some extent, to co-exist. Hence, he suggests
that drawing Habermas’ ideas of deliberative democracy and communicative action
together could prove more relevant in the school context through consideration of
the notion of ‘deliberative communication’. This offers an interesting synthesis of
the Habermasian stance on the centrality of purposeful communication and the com-
ing together of different perspectives for a classroom context. Englund offers ﬁve
characteristics of deliberative communication within school contexts. These seem to
have a potential application to how we may move forward our understanding of
feedback practices.
(1) Different views are confronted with one another along with arguments for
these views.
(2) There is tolerance and respect for these other perspectives.
(3) Elements of collective will formation are present (i.e. trying to reach
consensus).
(4) Authorities or traditional views can be questioned and challenged (recognis-
ing the relationships between the private and the public).
(5) There is scope for students to communicate and deliberate without teacher
control (summarised from Englund, 2006, p. 512).
What Englund offers is a useful application of aspects of Habermas’ thinking,
yet it seems lacking. Englund’s synthesis seems to give insufﬁcient scope for prag-
matics, and the recognition of social action, which is implicit in Habermas’ original
notion of communicative action. Englund’s idea for ‘deliberative communication’
might be further strengthened by recognising and incorporating the importance of
consequences. Hence, the phrase ‘deliberative communicative action’ may more
fully embrace Habermas’ ideas. Perhaps it is a liberty to connect these two aspects
of Habermas’ thinking. Yet they seem to reﬂect the essence of his thinking as it
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might be applied to a school context involving pupils. It is from this theoretical
position the paper moves forward to considering a more speciﬁc application to
feedback processes.
How does Habermas’ notion of (deliberative) communicative action enable us
to further understand feedback?
As a starting point for teasing out some more speciﬁc points for application for
Habermas’ theory, there is a warning, and a stern one. It is drawn from Habermas
himself, who recognises that the views he offers may sit in tension with increasing
colonisation of institutions such as schools. This might be seen in terms of education
being colonised by an economic agenda so that the purposes of schooling become
more inﬂuenced by measurable economic currency and outcomes than they are by
teaching and learning relationships. Habermas’ comments on colonisation as being
characterised by the ‘bureaucratization of decisions, duties and rights, responsibili-
ties and dependencies’ and redeﬁnes ‘goals, relations and services, life-spaces and
life-times’ (Habermas, 1987, p. 322). This results in teaching, learning and knowl-
edge being detached from lifeworlds and colonised by particular reproducing tradi-
tions which promote a particular performativity discourse. For us to beneﬁt from
Habermas’ thinking, as applied to feedback, there needs to be openness for learners
to offer their perspectives and for teachers to recognise that a unidirectional focused
feedback statement aimed at closing the learning gap may be limiting. In recognis-
ing that there is scope for other ways, some suggestions for developing feedback
using (deliberative) communicative action are offered.
Making teaching intentions and learning targets explicit
Feedback may be focused on speciﬁc aspects of teaching and focused lesson objec-
tives. The ‘objective world’, as part of the performitivity discourse, in which there
are prescribed norms and expectations for the curriculum and achievement is very
real for schools. Indeed, they seem to pervade the learning environment in the UK.
These cannot be ignored. However, they need to be simply justiﬁed and related to
the school, classroom and community contexts, and learners need the space to link
them to their own understandings and aspirations. Making teaching intentions and
learning goals speciﬁc is an important dimension of classroom practice and one
which helps to make transparent the prescribed curriculum for both teacher and
pupil. Furthermore, ways in which pupils need to make their learning ‘visible’
(Hattie, 2009), whether through classroom tasks, tests, assessments and
examinations, should be espoused. These form part of the feedback context.
Recognising that feedback is able to link the past, present and future
Recognising that feedback is able to link the past, present and future in relation to
what is learnt, how it is learnt and what might happen next. Careful consideration
should be given to the balance of each of these so that neither the teacher nor the
learner overly prioritises one over the others. An important dimension of developing
feedback drawing on Habermas’ principles highlights the importance of all partici-
pants being able to draw on their previous experiences. For the pupils, this may
include previous fears, anxieties, failures or successes. It may involve articulating
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their own self-referenced perceptions of the learning journey. It could also include
their perceptions of peer pressures or external inﬂuences, entrenched or emerging.
Their aspirations and motivations for their next steps of learning are, therefore, not
disconnected from the journey that proceeds. The teacher should also share his/her
own understanding of each child and the unique ways in which she/he regards the
learners progress and how the past, present and future might look and could be
altered.
Giving genuine space to the learners’ and teachers’ own priorities
Giving genuine space to the learners’ and teachers’ own priorities for learning in
terms of content, process and disposition. It may well be that the priorities of the
teacher and learner differ and do not closely relate to normative requirements. As
part of the experience of engaging with feedback, pupils and teachers need scope for
justifying their perspectives. This need not be on a one-to-one basis at every
moment of feedback. It could be part of small group discussion and occasional one-
to-one encounters. It could also be with teaching assistants and learning support
workers who are appropriately trained.
Opportunities for learners to articulate their own interests, priorities, barriers,
opposition, aspirations need to form part of the communication of feedback. This is
perhaps where Habermas’ ideas are more difﬁcult to relate to the realities of class-
rooms without careful consideration and purposeful planning. If feedback is merely
conceived of as being a mechanism for closing a learning gap between what is
known and what is unknown, there is no account given to the ways in which the
pupil owns and regulates that learning gap. It may be that for some children, with
particular learning dispositions, a tightly focused system of focused feedback may
work well and be an important part of the way in which they manage and regulate
their learning so that it is well aligned to the intentions of teaching. For other pupils,
there may be little alignment of teacher intention to pupils’ learning aspirations.
Tightly focused feedback, which may have all the positive effect characteristics,
summarised by Hattie and Timperley (2007), Shute (2008) and Black and Wiliam
(1998), may yield little beneﬁt. Where pupils clearly take little regard of the feed-
back given, entering into a process of communicative action may be a way forward.
Here, the pupil would be invited to talk about three distinct ‘worlds’ from his or her
own perspective: the content of learning (objective world), the classroom and lesson
context (social world), his/her own personal priorities and aspirations (lifeworld).
There would also be an expectation that the pupil would argue for his/her views.
The views and priorities of the teacher (or support worker) would also be shared
and argued as part of the collaborative communication. This process would allow
space for the pupil to air his/her own views which may have three key advantages.
Firstly, it exposes rather than suppresses the pupils’ views, illustrating that someone
wants to hear. Secondly, the process of articulating your views, achievements,
aspirations and difﬁculties can sometimes enable these to be more clearly crys-
tallised. Thirdly, it gives the teacher useful insight into how learning and teaching
may need to be adjusted to better align curriculum priorities with the pupils own
learning agenda. Furthermore, it offers a practical context for Kreisberg’s notion of
power with (op cit).
Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy & Practice 409
Developing the role of argument in the process of communicative action needs
careful consideration
Habermas is clear to promote the role of offering reasoned justiﬁcation for the per-
spectives advanced. This would hold equally for teachers and pupils, and could form
the basis from which agreement emerges. The level of abstract thinking which pupils
might be able (or willing) to apply to their thinking will vary to some extent with
the child’s age. It will also vary in terms of the relative positioning the pupil choses
to take in balancing his/her ‘three worlds’. The teacher (or adult) role in the process
of communicative action may need to be aimed at helping to offer a justiﬁable rea-
son for the pupil to consider rebalancing or repositioning these three worlds. Even
though the content of the subject-speciﬁc feedback may remain the same, the mode
of communication, the appeal to reason and the recognition of pupil priorities, each
has a place in the pupils choosing to engage with the feedback. Pupils, therefore,
need to be helped to think through their reasoning and justiﬁcation. For younger
children, this may involve some structured questions or prompts which can aid their
thinking. These higher level thinking skills themselves form part of their learning
and are a feature of engaging with the assessment and feedback process. The
metacognitive requirements implicit here should be seen as developmental and part
of formative assessment demonstrated through ‘assessment as learning’ (Dann,
2014). There is an interesting juxtaposition here between assessment and learning.
This illustrates that the process of being engaged in understanding and interpreting
feedback becomes part of pupils’ own learning processes (AaL).
Recognising the age of the child in developing feedback through communicative
action
Recognising the age of the child in developing feedback through communicative
action requires adapting processes. Planning appropriate support for enabling the
pupil to articulate a reasoned justiﬁcation for his/her engagement with learning and
with feedback should be considered. Younger children, whose metacognitive skills
are more limited, may bring less rational and reasoned arguments. The process of
communicative action as a forum to help develop metacognive skills is an important
dimension and locates this form of feedback as part of AaL. Additionally, for those
under age 10, drawing on Selman’s theory (op cit), the adult needs to acknowledge
that relationships are not fully mutual, and that the children’s perspective is based
on a more limited sense of the ‘other’. Nevertheless, part of the discussion about
perspectives and sharing views can be useful to help the learner become more able
to see other views. Such processes could usefully enable them to develop the skills
to begin to step outside themselves as their maturity increases. The way in which
feedback is shared for those children using communicative action will therefore have
to be developed in age-appropriate ways. At the initial phase of introduction, it is
suggested that feedback using communicative action should be one to one and
outside a particular lesson context.
Consideration timing and context
Consideration timing and context will form the basis of the feasibility of developing
feedback practices. Unless the ideas suggested in this paper can be related to the
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realities of classrooms, there is little likelihood that feedback using communicative
action can move beyond the theoretical foundation that this paper offers. In the
beginning, to ground the ideas into the realities of classrooms, there needs to be a
sense in which pupils, who struggle to progress adequately, and for whom conven-
tional feedback strategies seems to offer little relevance, can be offered an alternative
feedback approach. The number of pupils selected in any classroom context would
need to be small and one-to-one discussions developed within timetabled ‘correction
time’, ‘ﬁx it time’, ‘ﬁnishing off time’ as part of a differentiated approach. The idea
that this is deliberative, valued and planned is an important dimension of this
approach. At the start, the deliberative approach may be one-sided, initiated by the
teacher. However, clearly it is important to help the pupil to be deliberative in
his/her engagement through genuine open involvement.
Balancing written and spoken communication in the process of giving feedback
Much of the feedback given by teachers, considered by research, relates to written
feedback. It is more tangible in nature and thus far more easily analysed. Written
feedback becomes part of the documentary evidence often used in schools for ‘mak-
ing practice visible’ (Plum, 2012, p. 496). Furthermore, and more importantly, it can
be composed outside the classroom context and thus not compete for time in the
teaching and learning classroom encounters. Any attempt to incorporate aspects of
Communicative Action into the processes of making feedback more successful
requires creating space for dialogue. This is currently particularly contentious in the
UK educational arena, in which spoken language has been given little status in the
new National Curriculum. Such a position sits alongside a political ideology claim-
ing, with the words of Texan President Lyndon B. Johnson, ‘you aren’t learning
anything when you’re talking’. (Gove, 2013). If Habermas’ theory is to have value
in the feedback process, it requires language, dialogue and communication to be
deliberate, meaningful and genuine. Feedback using CA can be linked to what is
written, it can also be given visibility as a process, quite a different visibility from
that which seems to have become the currency, to be measured in our school
accountability systems.
Seeking genuine agreement which sets out agreed actions
Seeking genuine agreement which sets out agreed actions which are followed up
and discussed in the future. The process of communicative action should be ongoing
and developmental. Part of the discussion between participants should be about time
frames and be part of ongoing discussions about how actions will move forward. As
actions develop, they may be perceived differently by participants. Unless commu-
nication is deliberative and ongoing if will be fairly futile as a component of
enabling learning to progress.
Education for adults involved in feedback using Communicative Action will be
essential
A key component of educating staff in schools would be ensuring that adults/teach-
ers understand the difference between giving ‘strategic’ feedback aimed at changing
the pupils’ actions to be in line with teachers’ intentions, and feedback using CA.
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Furthermore, children who struggle to respond to more conventional feedback are
more likely to be chosen for strategies using CA. Skills in listening and giving the
child his/her voice as well as facilitating him/her to offer reasoned arguments, in an
age appropriate way, will need to feature in the education programme.
Testing theory
This paper has attempted to consider Habermas’ theory of Communicative Action
in relation to research evidence, possibilities and limitations of what we know about
pupil feedback. The links forged illuminate how Habermas considered communica-
tion as essential to giving meaning to action as well as recognising that each indi-
vidual should have the opportunity to reason, argue and present his/her views so
that an agreed way forward is reached. The ideas elicited from Habermas offer an
additional layer of thinking that has hitherto not been part of the way in which feed-
back has been considered. This paper is theoretical and needs to be followed by
some careful application and development in classroom contexts. The theoretical
foundations offered in this paper are already part of a small-scale empirical study in
primary school settings and offer rich opportunities for further research and
investigation.
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